In this paper we analyze the relationship between strictness of employment protection and efficiency of bankruptcy law. We argue that country's legal tradition provides the appropriate institutional proxy to explain the nature of such relationship. We find that for civil law countries where bankruptcy procedures are more inefficient a stricter employment protection policy is enforced. For common law countries no relationship between employment protection and bankruptcy law is obtained. These results support the thesis that inefficiencies in bankruptcy law help employment protection policies for interventionist governments. They are also consistent with normative theories of bankruptcy for common law countries.
Introduction
There is a vast literature on the efficiency of bankruptcy law 1 , and on the regulation of labor and employment protection 2 , but not much has been written about both. 3 In fact, bankruptcy law aims at solving financial distress whereas employment law aims at regulating the labor market, hence no obvious relationship between both exists. The interests of workers in bankruptcy law are considered inasmuch as they are creditors, but not the consequences in terms of employment. However, in some countries, there is a feeling that bankruptcy law is used as an inefficient mechanism to protect jobs: bankrupt firms linger on for years, failing or delaying payments under governments' protection, to avoid job losses. Therefore, the inefficiency of bankruptcy procedures can be analyzed as a strategic intervention to facilitate employment protection by increasing exit costs for firms. 4 Testing whether there is a meaningful relationship between employment protection and inefficiency of bankruptcy procedures is the purpose of this paper.
If we take the perspective that bankruptcy law is about the capital market and employment protection is about the labor market, no meaningful relationship should be expected to be observed. 5 If both bankruptcy and employment laws are inefficient, it does not follow that the more inefficient one is, the more inefficient the other should be, since the underlying reasons for inefficiency are not obviously connected. However, once governments use bankruptcy procedure as a strategic device to protect jobs, we can claim that the more inefficient is bankruptcy law, the higher employment protection we expect to observe. By increasing exit costs to firms, the costs for the government from implementing employment protection policies are reduced.
In this paper, we investigate if sclerotic labor markets 6 go side by side with inefficient bankruptcy policies.
In this analysis we consider an inefficient bankruptcy policy (either liquidation or reorganization procedures 7 ) as one taking a long time to conclude the procedure. This eventually allows economically unviable firms, which inevitably become financially distressed, to remain opened for a long time before at last closing. This can directly be the effect of a bad design of bankruptcy laws, or its abusive usage, allowed by the overall legal and judicial environment. Those all sum up to the fact that the visible face of an inefficient bankruptcy policy is a high cost of firm closure. 8 We conduct the analysis testing the hypothesis that (i) countries with more protected labor markets are the 1 See the book edited by Bhandari and Weiss (1996) and references therein. 2 See Botero et. al. (2004) and references therein. 3 An exception is Armour and Deakin (2002) . 4 See Morgado (2005) for a theoretical exposition of this idea. 5 A conclusion supported by the normative theory developed by Schwartz (2005) . 6 As measured by a stricter employment protection legislation: we apply the result by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) that higher degrees of employment protection are associated with more rigid labor markets. Therefore we measure such rigidity indirectly using the Employment Protection Index from OECD Employment Outlook. 7 We follow Armour (2001) and we use the terms "liquidation" and "reorganization" meaning the possible outcomes of (corporate) insolvency procedures (known as "bankruptcy" in the US). We take "insolvency" to mean "financial distress", i.e., the firm cannot pay its debts as they fall due. Therefore, the terms "liquidation" and "reorganization" refer to the outcomes of "financial distress", taking "liquidation" to mean conversion of a firm's assets into cash, through sale and "reorganization" meaning financial restructuring of a financially distressed firm, where claimants exchange their old claims for new ones, which will necessarily be less than the face value of their old claims, because the firm has been unable to pay its debts. 8 We measure this cost using data available from the World Bank Doing Business Database; see http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/ExploreTopics/ClosingBusiness/ the World Bank Doing Business Database (2004).
ones evidencing a less efficient bankruptcy procedure vs. (ii) inexistence of evidence of such a statement in any of the countries. We conclude, however, that neither of the hypotheses are sustained by empirical evidence.
This leads us to conclude, that whilst hypothesis (i) is valid for a group of OECD countries, hypothesis (ii) is the one sustained by another group.
The claim of the paper is not, therefore, that more efficient bankruptcy procedures go side by side with less employment protection always. In itself, that would be a simple observation given the nature of inefficient law.
In fact, we argue that countries with more employment protection have inefficient bankruptcy laws because of the interventionist nature of the government on the labor market. Inefficient bankruptcy laws are part of a given political strategy. However, for countries with a less interventionist nature, no relationship can be established with respect to bankruptcy law since whatever the nature of inefficiencies is, they are not related.
Efficient bankruptcy procedure aims at solving financial distress, and no inference can be made with respect to employment.
We use the legal family as a proxy for the institutional arrangement that fosters bankruptcy procedures that are used as strategic devices to intervene in the labor market. Contrary to narrow interpretations of the recent literature in Law and Finance, we do not claim that legal families determine the existing relationship, but they can be used as a good proxy for the interventionist nature of the government. 9 We use a sample of twenty three developed countries to make sure that the distinction between common law and civil law countries is driven not by developing economies with obvious problems concerning legal enforcement. 10 They are classified into common law or civil law countries according to La Porta et. al. (1998) .
For civil law countries, we find that countries evidencing higher degrees of employment protection are usually the countries where it is more difficult and costly to close a firm. For common law countries, no evidence for such a relation between employment protection and efficiency of bankruptcy laws exists. Our reasoning for the results rests upon the observation that inefficient bankruptcy policies provide the adequate context for employment protection to be implemented, when regulation of markets is more common given the interventionist nature of governments, as certainly is the case in civil law countries.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the data is described; in section 3 the theory underlying the empirically tests is described; the results are presented in section 4; in section 5, we test several alternative specifications for robustness which we report in detail in the appendix; and section 6 concludes the paper. 
Employment Protection Legislation
The OECD defines employment protection legislation (EPL) as referring both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated prenotification periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes). EPL stands for employment protection regulation generally, but it refers to all types of measures, whether grounded primarily in legislation, court rulings, collectively bargained conditions of employment or customary practice. Therefore, and for the rest of the paper, EPL stands for employment protection in its wide sense, not only legislation itself, but its 11 We are aware of the controversies surrounding such classification but have decided to use the now standard LLSV approach for consistency. 4 practice as well, constructing, therefore, a thorough perspective of the degree of employment protection in the selected OECD countries in 1999. The reason for this strategy is that some forms of regulations are likely to be adopted even in the absence of legislation, simply because both workers and employers take advantages from long-term employment relations and for the sake of stability of such a relationship. Therefore, EPL refers to regulations, besides explicit legislation, concerning either hiring and firing.
Employment protection has been in increasing demand from public, due to the heightened perception of job insecurity in many OECD countries and fear of job loss. The great objective of employment protection measures, either public through labor laws or private through contractual arrangements, are directed to enhance job security. However, those measures may be incompatible with labor market flexibility and an extensive line of research has erupted around this issue. 12 In this paper we use two measures for a country's Employment Protection. 13 One is the EPL index calculated in the OECD Employment Outlook. It consists of a composite measure of indicators of the strictness of employment protection for regular as well as temporary employment. It is calculated from weighted averages of indicator variables from a group of select countries. As far as regular employment is concerned, these indicators refer to regular procedural inconveniences to dismiss an employee, notice and severance pay for nofault individual dismissals, definition of unfair dismissal, trial period before eligibility arises, unfair dismissal compensation at 20 years of tenure and extent of reinstatement. As far as temporary work is concerned, selected indicators are the cases where fixed-term contract is permitted, the maximum number of successive fixed term contracts, maximum cumulated duration of fixed term contracts, types of work for which temporary work agencies (twa) employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals of twa contracts and the maximum cumulated duration of twa contracts. Some of these variables are qualitative in nature and the quantitative ones have differences in scale. Therefore, every individual indicator was converted into cardinal scores normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scoring representing stricter regulation. Since theoretical background on employment protection legislation emphasizes the similitude of EPL to a tax on the employer, stricter regulation can be interpreted as higher employer-borne cost of dismissing. The values for both the OECD EPL index and for the World Bank EPL index for the selected countries are in the appendix A.2.
Bankruptcy Law Efficiency
In this section we describe the method of calculation of a measure of a country's bankruptcy law efficiency.
Here we take efficiency in a broad ex post sense, i.e., we analyze the outcomes of a bankruptcy procedure in terms of how much time it takes to close a business: the greater the speed, the greater the degree of efficiency.
We also take into consideration the legal context of a country, since it conditions the way the law is applied: the same law design may have different effects according to the context where it is applied, e.g., slow courts will make the average time to close a business to be longer, caeteris paribus. Briefly, we actually take inefficiency of bankruptcy law to mean high (exogenous) exit costs and we use variables that influence such exit costs: slow judicial systems and messy bankruptcy procedures increase the exit costs. When firms face high exit costs they take longer to leave the market. Therefore "in countries where bankruptcy is inefficient, unviable businesses linger around for years, preventing assets and human capital from being allocated to more productive uses.
Most often, the bottlenecks in bankruptcy are associated with the inefficient judicial process, and hence the unwillingness of banks and other lenders to push for a formal insolvency resolution." It should be noted that an increase in the size of the variables indicate an increase in exit costs, except for the variable "percentage of recovered debt after closing the business", an increase of which indicates a more successful firm closure as far as creditors are concerned. We use Principal Component Analysis to reduce the number of variables to measure exit costs, since the availability of data points is very limited (23 countries) 15 .
Using this method we build four indexes: (i) using only data from the World Bank Doing Business Database we create "WB closing a business index", explaining about 70% of total variance of the three variables that 14 From WB Doing Business Database 15 In this section, we compute all the indexes using the 47-country sample present in La Porta et. al. (1998) . It would have been possible to compute the indexes from the World Bank data with as much as 141 observations. However, we decided to use the same countries than La Porta et. al. (1998) to ensure comparable results. Another difficulty is present in the number of countries for which an EPL measure is available from the OECD Employment Outlook: only 23 countries are present both in OECD EPL measure and our sample of 47 countries. Therefore, we compute the indexes using Principal Component Analysis using 47 data points, but in the regression analysis that follows we are only able to use 23 observations. In appendix C the same analysis is conducted but using only the 23 relevant countries that are ultimately used in the regression analysis. The qualitative results are identical to the ones presented in this section and the following ones. 
On the Relations Between Employment Protection and Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures
Governments may want to intervene in the labor market due to social pressure. This social pressure is all the greater, the larger is the number of unemployed people. In cases where labor markets are sclerotic, being difficult to find a job match worker-employer, the incentive for Governments to intervene is even larger. 16 If the bankruptcy process is very lengthy and being it the only alternative after a private settling between creditors and debtor has not been able to achieve a feasible result, then firms face a high exit cost. The lengthier the bankruptcy process, the higher the exit cost. We assume that the cost of private negotiation is even higher due to large asymmetry of information.
If the government wants to intervene and prevent unemployment, a subsidy would have to be paid to the firm to avoid laying-off of workers. This is conceptually equivalent to setting costs on the act of firing. Under high exit costs, the subsidy that would have to be paid to avoid a firm laying-off its workers would be lower than under the case of low exit costs, since the firm is less willing to leave the market in this case. Therefore, we argue that the cost of employment protection is lower when high exit costs for the firm are higher. Hence, if governments want to protect employment it would be efficient to accompany such measures with inefficient bankruptcy laws. In consequence, we formulate the following hypothesis for testing:
Hypothesis 1: higher levels of employment protection are in average associated with inefficient bankruptcy systems However, given the perspective of Anglo-Saxon countries, typically non-interventionist by legal tradition, any relation that may be thought connecting bankruptcy procedures and employment protection is meaningless.
Therefore, the hypothesis against which we are testing our theory is:
Hypothesis 2: absence of relationship between employment protection and efficiency in bankruptcy
Given the low quality of data, the inexistence of a meaningful relationship can mean either that the sample quality is preventing us to find such a relationship even though it exists, or that the relation really has no empirical confirmation. However, despite the low quality of the data, we do find a relationship, but only among the civil law countries. The analysis of the results follow.
Analysis of Results
Given the values of the EPL indexes and of the several bankruptcy efficiency indexes values defined above, We consider Denmark and Switzerland to be special cases of civil law countries and choose not to include them in the analysis that follows. In the appendix, the same analysis is conducted, but including those countries in the group of civil law countries. We show that the qualitative conclusions are identical, but less significant due to the limited number of available data points. Since Denmark and Switzerland are detached from the group of civil law countries, it is only natural that the conclusion about the relation between variables in these countries loose significance if Denmark and Switzerland are included in the same group.
Another feature that all scatter diagrams present is the apparent relation between EPL and the several The striking feature of these results is that they are also evident when we use data from a different source.
When we analyze the relation between EPL and bankruptcy efficiency, calculated using the World Bank 2004 database, we find exactly the same pattern: no significant relation among common law countries (with Denmark and Switzerland detached from the rest of the sample of civil law countries) and the above mentioned trend; civil law countries with an inefficient bankruptcy law tend to be more protective of labor. This is clear in figure   3 .
These features, although analytical testing is needed, point to the fact that legal family is an important factor determining the existence of relationships between employment protection policy and factors determining efficiency in bankruptcy. Civil law countries do seem to have the necessary ingredients to cause such a relation to emerge (except for Denmark and Switzerland) 17 , while it does not exist among common law countries.
To analyze the relation between employment protection and efficiency of bankruptcy law we estimate the following models:
17 See Appendix B.
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Bankruptcy Environment (Judicial Environment) Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Table 3 : Regression Analysis using data from La Porta (1998) and OECD (1999)
In this model, EP L stands for the OECD employment protection legislation index, benchmarked 1999, As stated above, W BI increases with bankruptcy law inefficiency, therefore we anticipate a positive value for parameter α 1 . But, CR and LE increase with greater creditor protection and efficiency of legal system respectively, therefore we anticipate negative values for parameters β 1 and β 2 .
If there is any relation at all between EP L and bankruptcy law efficiency among civil law countries, we expect to reject the null β 1 = β 2 = 0 in model 1 and α 1 = 0 in model 2. Also, if such a relation does not exist among common law countries we expect not to reject the null β 1 + δ 1 = β 2 + δ 2 = 0 in model 1 and not reject the null α 1 + γ 1 = 0 in model 2. Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results for each model.
In regression presented in table 3, for the null
with a p-value of 0.73, yielding its non-rejection as expected. For the null β 1 = β 2 = 0 the relevant test statistic is F = 16.59 indicating a clear rejection of the null at less than 1% (p-value equal to 0.00016). In the regression presented in table 4, the estimated value for α 1 is clearly statistically different from zero, while the result of the test for α 1 + γ 1 = 0 is F = 1.24, indicating a clear non-rejection (p-value equal to 0.28). Prob(F-statistic) 0.000069 Table 4 : Regression Analysis using data from the World Bank legislation, but only among countries without a common law tradition. Amongst these, we could not find any significant relation.
A Few Comments

On Culture and Wealth
Following Stulz and Williamson (2003), we would expect that cultural values and the country's domestic income
should influence the relation between EPL stringency and bankruptcy efficiency (in the sense given to it in this paper). Specifically, and also taking religion as a proxy for culture: (i) wealthier countries (measured by the logarithm of per capita GDP) should have freer labor markets, with smaller firing costs and, therefore, a lower degree of EPL stringency; (ii) Roman Catholic countries, being expected to be more interventionist, should both protect employment more and have a more inefficient bankruptcy system with a poorer creditor protection.
We have included the logarithm of per capita GDP as a regressor and also a dummy for catholic countries in our previous regressions. We conclude that our basic result is kept, but although the sign is correct, we do not find a significant effect of GDP on EPL. Also, the dummy variable for religion turns out as non-significant:
we were unable to relate bankruptcy efficiency and EPL stringency dividing countries according to the main religion.
We also go a step further, making some hypothesis whether it is cultural diversity within a country that accounts for freer labor markets (i.e., smaller EPL stringency) and more efficient bankruptcy. We measure cultural diversity using the Herfindahl Index of Concentration. This index have a maximum value of 1 if 100% of the population practices the same religion and 0.25 if the population is equally distributed among the four identified categories (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, other beliefs). We were unable to find a significant effect of cultural diversity in our model. Moreover, controlling both for GDP and for cultural diversity our result is still significant: greater bankruptcy efficiency is associated with lower EPL stringency only among civil law countries. See appendix D where we report the results using the World Bank Doing Business Database.
12
On Reverse Causality
Higher levels of employment protection result from labor pressure 18 . Higher unemployment typically creates higher labor pressure, so we expect that higher unemployment would induce higher employment protection stringency. However, the reverse is not true: following Blanchard and Portugal (2001), higher EPL increases unemployment duration, but decreases flows through unemployment, therefore both effects cancel out and there isn't evidence that higher EPL induces higher unemployment.
On the other hand, inefficient bankruptcy procedures may result either from a bad law design, lacking clarity and allowing for discretionary actions from the several parties involved, or from a poor enforcement of law. Laws with similar designs perform very differently according to the degree of enforcement. Moreover, the way courts function also influence the way the bankruptcy law is applied. Slow courts contribute significantly for the inefficiency of the bankruptcy system.
Although in Europe bankruptcy laws basic principles are very similar across countries 19 the practical effects are very different, as can be seen by the variance of the indicator on the efficiency of bankruptcy. Therefore, it seems that the inefficiency of a bankruptcy procedure, as we understand it, is not so much related to the design of the law itself, but to the circumstances under which it is applied, as far as the analised countries are concerned.
Such a conclusion is strengthened if courts are influenced by the local labor market context, as suggested by Ichino (2003) . In that case, we expect in average more pro-worker decisions in countries with higher labor pressure. In the context of bankruptcy law this would mean either greater values of damages paid to workers when firms close or a greater effort to avoid job destruction, resulting in more bankruptcy cases ending in eventually lengthy recovery procedures rather than liquidation procedures. France is the example of such a case. 20 Therefore, the conditions of local labor markets may influence both the stringency of employment protection and the length of a bankruptcy process. However, bankruptcy procedures may become lengthy either in order to avoid job destruction or due to the existence of very stringent employment protection legislation. The latter case creates a problem of reverse causality. According to our theory, inefficient bankruptcy systems decrease the cost of labor protection 21 and, therefore, interventionist countries will use an inefficient bankruptcy system to be able to increase labor market protection. Reverse causality will occur if bankruptcy systems are inefficient, meaning a lengthy and costly firm exit, due to high labour protection stringency.
If either courts or government respond to labor pressure, eventually for political reasons, and through that mechanism make bankruptcy systems inefficient (lengthy) then this should happen in all countries independently 18 Roe (2003 
As before, EP L is the employment protection legislation stringency index and B is an index for bankruptcy efficiency; vectors z i are exogenous variables (per capita GDP and unionized index and unemployment rate to control for labor market pressure).
In interventionist countries we should have γ 1 6 = 0 and γ 2 6 = 0, actually it should be the case of γ 1 < 0 if higher B means greater efficiency, as well as γ 2 < 0. In non-interventionist countries we should have γ 1 = 0 but To allow for identification of structural parameters, we exclude per capita GNP from the equation for EPL and exclude the unionization rate from the equation for bankruptcy efficiency. We estimate using GMM with White covariance matrix.
22
Given the limitations imposed on the analysis due to data availability, we cannot run the tests using the sample of common law countries, taken as the non-interventionist group, as before. Therefore, we present the tests performed just in the rather small group of civil law countries, excluding for Denmark and Switzerland.
Also, given the time structure of the data, we cannot run the tests using the date from La Porta et al, since the indexes measuring bankruptcy efficiency from this source date from the 1980's and 1990's, all previous to any of the EPL measures available. Therefore, we can say that reverse causality is not an issue on the results using data from La Porta et al and the OECD Employment Outlook.
We analyze reverse causality, therefore, using just data from the World Bank Doing Business Database.
Estimation results suggest that in civil law countries, γ 1 > 0 but γ 2 = 0, 23 suggesting absence of reverse causality. The unemployment rate seems irrelevant.
Given the time structure of the data, we are assuming the presence of large lagged effects: e.g., percentage
of union trade members in 1997, affects WBI in 2004. Notwithstanding, we cannot find evidence of reverse causality, thus validating the analysis in the previous section.
Conclusion
We find a positive relationship between bankruptcy law inefficiency and employment protection for civil law countries and no significant relationship for common law countries. These results suggest two observations. 22 Although the properties of GMM estimation are very poor in small samples, under reverse causality, the least squares method used in the previous section would yield biased and inconsistent estimators. 23 See appendix A, on the construction of WBI index. First, for more interventionist governments, a more inefficient bankruptcy law that increases the costs of exit for firms provides a stimulating environment to implement employment protection. Second, for less interventionist governments, the inefficiencies of bankruptcy procedures are unrelated to employment policies.
A. Appendix To make the data comparable across countries, several assumptions about the worker and the business are
employed. Following the OECD Job Study and the International Encyclopedia for Labor Law and Industrial
Relations, the areas subject to statutory regulation in all countries were identified. Those include hiring of workers, conditions of employment, and firing of workers.
It is assumed that the worker is a non-executive, full-time male employee who has worked in the same company for 20 years; earns a salary plus benefits equal to the country's average wage during the entire period of his employment; has a nonworking wife and two children and the family resides in the country's most populous city; is a lawful citizen who belongs to the same race and religion as the majority of the country's population;
and is not a member of the labor union, unless membership is mandatory.
It is assumed that the business is a limited liability company; operates in the country's most populous city;
is 100 percent domestically owned; operates in the manufacturing sector; has 201 employees; and abides by every law and regulation, but does not grant workers more benefits than legally mandated.
All variables are indices having several components and taking values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation.
• The Difficulty of Hiring index (code: diffict_hire) measures (i) whether term contracts can only be used for temporary tasks; (ii) the maximum duration of term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the mandated 24 As described in http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/Methodology/HiringFiringWorkers.aspx minimum wage (or apprentice wage, if available) to the average value-added per working population. A country is assigned a score of 1 if term contracts can only be used for temporary tasks, and a score of 0 if term contracts can be used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the duration of term contracts is 3 years or less; 0.5 if the duration is between 3 and 5 years; and 0 if term contracts can last more than 5
years. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of minimum wage to average value added per worker ratio is higher than 0.75; 0.67 for ratios between 0.50 and 0.75; 0.33 for ratios between 0.25 and 0.50; and a score of 0 if the ratio is below 0.25.
• The Rigidity of Hours index (code: rigidt_hrs) has five components: (i) whether night work is restricted; (ii) whether weekend work is allowed; (iii) whether the workweek consists of five-and-a-half days or more; (iv) whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or more (including overtime); and (v)
whether the annual paid vacation days are 21 days or less. If the answer is no on any of these questions, the country is assigned a score of 1, otherwise a score of 0 is assigned.
• The Difficulty of Firing index (code: diffict_fire) has eight components: (i) whether redundancy is not grounds for dismissal; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry for firing one redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry for group dismissals; (iv) whether the employer needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for firing one redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for group dismissals; (vi) whether the law mandates training or replacement prior to dismissal; (vii) whether priority rules apply for dismissals; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for re-employment. If the answer to any question is yes, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is given. Questions (i) and (iv) have double-weight in the construction of the final index.
• The Cost of Firing indicator (code: fire_cost) measures the cost of advance notice requirements, and severance payments and penalties due when firing a worker, expressed in terms of weekly wages.
As announced in the World Bank Doingbusiness website, this methodology is developed in Botero et. al.
(2004), and was adopted with changes.
Efficiency of Bankruptcy
:
As far as measuring the time and cost of insolvency proceedings, we use data available from the World Bank Doing Business Database. This database was created in a way such that it is comparable across countries. The data are derived from survey responses by local law firms when they were faced with an hypothetical business closure problem.
The hypothetical business is a limited liability company that operates in the country's most populous city; it is 100% domestically owned, of which 51% is owned by its founder, who is also the chairman of the supervisory 25 As described in http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/Methodology/ClosingBusiness.aspx board (all other shareholders detain less than 1% of shares each). The business is run by a professional general manager. The business has downtown real estate as its major asset, on which it runs a hotel and has average annual revenue of 1000 times income per capita over the last three years. The business employs 201 people and 50 suppliers, each of whom is owed money for the last delivery. It borrowed from a domestic bank five years ago (the loan has 10 years to full repayment) and bought real estate (the hotel building), using it as a security for the bank loan. It has observed the payment schedule and all other conditions of the loan up to now, and has a mortgage with the current value of the mortgage principal being exactly equal to the market value of the hotel.
In January 2004, the business is experiencing liquidity problems. The company's loss in 2003 brought its net worth to a negative figure. There is no cash to pay the bank either interest or principal in full due on January, provision to that effect, this provision is specified in the lending contract.
The business has too many creditors to renegotiate out of court. Its options are: (i) a procedure aimed at rehabilitation or any procedure that will reorganize the business to permit further operation; (ii) a procedure aimed at liquidation; (iii) selling the hotel, either as a going concern or piecemeal, either enforced through court (or a government authority like a debt collection agency) or out of court (receivership).
• • Recovery Rate (code: rec_close): The recovery rate measures the efficiency of foreclosure or bankruptcy procedures. It estimates how many cents on the dollar claimants, creditors, tax authorities, and employees, recover from an insolvent firm. The calculation takes into account whether the business is kept as a going concern during the proceedings, as well as court, attorney and other related costs, and the discounted 20 value due to the time spent closing down. If the business keeps operating, no value is lost on the initial claim, set at 100 cents on the dollar. If not, the initial 100 cents on the dollar are reduced to 70 cents on the dollar. Then, the official costs of the insolvency procedure are deducted (1 cent for each percentage cost of the initial value). Finally, the value lost due to the time that the money remains tied up in insolvency procedures is taken into account, including the loss of value due to depreciation of the hotel furniture.
Consistent with the international accounting practice, the discount rate of office furniture is taken to be 20 percent. In turn, the value of the furniture is assumed to be a quarter of the total value of assets.
The recovery rate is the present value of the remaining proceeds, using end- 
A.2. Index Construction
The following Therefore, we identify Denmark and Switzerland as special cases within the group of civil law countries, typically less interventionist than the other countries in the same group and so we decided to exclude them from the regression analysis presented in the main text above.
B.2. Inclusion of Denmark and Switzerland
For robustness check purposes, herein we present the analysis conducted in the text in section 4, but including Denmark and Switzerland in the group of countries with civil law legal tradition. The qualitative conclusion is essentially identical. However, it does loose significance, specially using data from the World Bank, which is only natural due to the limited number of data points and the way the observations from Denmark and Switzerland change the scatter: they are clearly detached from the rest of the sample (see figure 3) . Tables 20   and 21 show the results. 
C. Robustness Check
Herein we repeat the analysis conducted in the text in section 4, but with indexes constructed using just the 23 countries that are ultimately available for use. The reason for this is based upon an observation by Stephen and van Hemmen (2003) . They conclude that the interactions between the size of the stock market and the investor protection laws depend on the quality of legal enforcement. Therefore, among countries with a reduced legal enforcement (like developing countries) the improvement of investor protection laws may have no effect on the increase of the size of the stock market. This observation is relevant here, because the indexes from sections 2 through 4 are calculated using 47 countries, among which countries with a very low legal enforcement. Since the interactions between the size of stock market and investor protection laws depend on the quality of legal enforcement, it is only reasonable to suppose that the same happens when we think of interactions between bankruptcy procedures efficiency and employment protection: the interactions identified in section 4 may be contaminated with the presence of countries with low legal enforcement in the calculation of the indexes.
To verify whether this is the case, we use here only the 23 countries present in section 4. We conclude that the qualitative results are identical, although a bit less obvious, specifically as far as the relation between EPL and the creditor rights index is concerned: although the same effect is still identifiable it is not as strong. We include Denmark and Switzerland in the civil law group.
In regression presented in table 23, for the null β 1 + δ 1 = β 2 + δ 2 = 0 the relevant test statistic is F = 0.1392 with a p-value of 0.871, yielding its non-rejection as expected. For the null β 1 = β 2 = 0 the relevant test statistic is F = 12.4333 indicating an extremely clear rejection of the null. In the regression presented in table 24 , the estimated value for α 1 is not, however, statistically different from zero and the result of the test for 
D. On Culture and Wealth
Results using the World Bank Doing Business Database, to test for effects of culture and wealth.
